INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2008, under a nearly moonless night sky, ten members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group 2 crouched aboard a small dinghy as it moved across the inky darkness of the Arabian Sea. 3 The men had abandoned their homes in the mountain villages of Eastern Pakistan and embarked on a one-way journey to the Indian coastline to "kill relentlessly." 4 Stained with blood after murdering the crew of an Indian fishing boat, the terrorists raced toward the darkened beach of the world's fourth largest city clutching automatic rifles, grenades, and satellite phones. 5 When their dinghy pushed ashore at a fisherman's slum in Mumbai's Back Bay, they ran into the bustling commercial capital to conduct one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in history. 6 Over the course of four days, the world watched as Indian authorities scrambled to counterattack, and the terrorists methodically killed 166 people. 7 The Mumbai attackers were guided to their targets by the detailed surveillance work of a U.S. citizen. 8 For nearly two years, David Coleman Headley had traveled around Mumbai, using a camera and pocket-sized Global Positioning System (GPS) to discreetly gather information about the Indian security apparatus and map out the scenes of mass murder. 9 In 2009, Headley was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare Airport and charged with aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. nationals. 10 He quickly confessed to his role in the Mumbai attacks. 11 In interviews with American and Indian authorities, Headley revealed that he and the LeT attackers had received money and other material support from agents of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the secretive Pakistani spy agency organized under Pakistan's Ministry of Defense. 12 Based on the information Headley 2. LeT is a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist organization that has conducted numerous attacks against Indian government and civilian targets inside both countries. See Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ let.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 9. See Government's Position Paper, supra note 8, at 3-4; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at 55-56.
10. See Government's Position Paper, supra note 8, at 4. 11. See id. at 7-9. 12. See id. at 8-9; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at xvi, 45, 53. provided, the Justice Department issued an indictment against the ISI official who Headley had identified as his primary contact. 13 When the victims of the Mumbai attacks filed an action in the Eastern District of New York against the ISI and two of its directors, the Pakistani government asserted immunity and petitioned the State Department to recommend that protection to the court. 14 The executive branch obliged, 15 and in the so-called "Rosenberg Statement," 16 it recommended dismissal of the allegations against the ISI under the statutory doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity 17 and dismissal of the allegations against the ISI officials under the federal common law doctrine of foreign official immunity. 18 The statement declared that the immunity determinations were binding on the court. 19 More significant, however, was the second to last page of the document, where the Executive asserted control over all future foreign official immunity determinations when it wrote:
[I]t is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official's official capacity. 20 And,
[B]ecause a foreign state's request for immunity on behalf of an official itself has foreign relations implications, courts should ensure that the Executive Branch has been notified of and had an opportunity to consider such a request before ruling on the immunity issue. Indeed, for that reason, a foreign state's request for an official's immunity should first be presented to the Department of State, not to the court. 21 These controversial assertions highlight the disarray that currently exists regarding determinations of foreign official immunity by the courts. 22 Unfortunately, this discord is not easily resolved because the doctrine of foreign official immunity involves the competing responsibilities of the 17. Foreign sovereign immunity is synonymous with foreign state immunity. 18. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 2, 7.
19. See id. at 1 (" [T] he Department of State has determined that the former Directors General of the ISI . . . enjoy immunity, a determination that is not subject to judicial review.").
20. Id. at 9-10. 21. Id. at 9 n.5. 22. See infra Part I. Previously, the Executive had merely claimed "the primary role in determining the immunity of foreign officials" without making such an explicit assertion of total control. Statement executive and judicial branches, and the Constitution does not provide a clear answer. 23 Therefore, a solution most likely requires action by the third branch of government: Congress. 24 Fortunately, the analogous history of foreign sovereign immunity provides a useful roadmap to a pragmatic solution for the current disarray in the doctrine of foreign official immunity. 25 In 1976, after years of uncertainty and tension sparked by a different-yet surprisingly similar-statement of exclusive power from the Executive, 26 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 27 (FSIA) and brought order to the immunity doctrine that protects foreign states and their instrumentalities from suit in U.S. courts. 28 The statute was a remarkable success and serves as a model for the current conflict. 29 This Note examines the federal common law of foreign official immunity in the aftermath of the Rosenberg Statement and suggests a statutory fix for the current confusion in the doctrine. Part I outlines the modern law of foreign official immunity and the overlapping constitutional responsibilities that give rise to conflict between the executive and judicial branches, as well as the resulting confusion and discord among the courts. Part II investigates the analogous history of foreign sovereign immunity and its legislative solution. Part III analyzes the Executive's foreign affairs power and its authority to assert control over determinations of foreign official immunity. Finally, Part IV uses this new understanding to propose a division of authority between the executive and judicial branches that employs the expertise and constitutional authority of each. This Note concludes with an argument in favor of a Foreign Official Immunities Act and an appendix containing a proposed statute. 32 and, predictably, 33 the courts have struggledand failed-to apply a consistent standard. 34 In the summer of 2015, a court in the Southern District of New York rejected the Executive's questionable assertion of control in the Rosenberg Statement and rendered an immunity determination that was not presented to the State Department in the first instance. 35 The court's decision highlights one unsettled aspect of a federal common law doctrine that needs repair.
Foreign official immunity determinations are difficult legal questions because the doctrine involves both the intersection of international and domestic law and the competing constitutional demands of the Executive and Judiciary. 36 Moreover, a court determination of nonimmunity in a case against a foreign official risks ruptures in relations with the official's country. 37 This is particularly problematic when the foreign country in question is a powerful one or an important ally. 38 Accordingly, some legal scholars argue that the Executive has a dominant role to play in recognizing and awarding foreign immunities because the determinations are integral to U.S. foreign policy, 39 and the Executive has plenary power over foreign affairs. 40 Other scholars, however, believe that the Executive has no place intruding on a legal question that is properly before the courts. 41 that immunities will be granted by the State Department for political reasons due to diplomatic pressure from allies, for example, or as bargaining chips with countries that have tense relations with the United States. 42 The underlying concern is that determinations that should be made by the Judiciary under the rule-of-law end up being discretionary political calls. 43 The resulting conflict produces a muddled doctrine, unclear standards, and a legal system that leaves parties unsure whether U.S. courts are available to resolve ordinary legal disputes against foreign individuals. 44 This part examines the recent history of foreign official immunity to determine how the doctrine deteriorated so quickly-a mere five years after the Samantar decision.
A. Foreign Official Immunity As a Matter of Federal Common Law
In November 2004, a class action was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia against a former high-ranking official of the government of Somalia. 45 The plaintiffs alleged that Mohamed Ali Samantar had facilitated widespread torture and extrajudicial killing in Somalia in the late 1980s. 46 Samantar's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds was granted when the district court decided that he was an "agency or instrumentality" of Somalia and entitled to protection under the FSIA. 47 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Samantar's dismissal and held the FSIA did not entitle him to immunity because the statute only applied to foreign states and their nonperson agencies or instrumentalities. 48 In 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit. 49 The Court's landmark decision effectively split the doctrine of foreign immunity into two parts: (1) the immunity of a foreign state and its nonperson agencies, 42 organizations, and instrumentalities-governed by the FSIA; 50 and (2) the immunity of a foreign individual who acts on behalf of that state, agency, organization, or instrumentality-now governed by standards of federal common law to be determined by the district court on remand. 51 After Samantar, the federal courts that have faced a request for foreign official immunity have usually reverted to a version of the historic "twostep procedure" that was used to determine foreign sovereign immunity in the years prior to the FSIA. 52 Under step one, the foreign government could request immunity directly from the State Department. 53 If the Executive decided that immunity was appropriate, the Justice Department would convey that determination to a court in a statement of interest. 54 Prior to the FSIA, these "suggestions of immunity" with respect to foreign sovereign immunity were binding and viewed as dispositive on the immunity request. 55 But in the years since Samantar, the Second and Fourth Circuits have split on the amount of deference that should be accorded to State Department suggestions of foreign official immunity. 56 Under step two, the foreign government could request immunity directly from a court. 57 Whether step one was required before a foreign defendant could proceed with step two remains uncertain, however, because the pre-FSIA procedure did not clearly divide authority between the executive and judicial branches. 58 Under pre-FSIA federal common law, 59 courts were empowered to decide immunity "in the absence of recognition" by the Executive. 60 But the courts were also required to make that determination "in conformity to the principles" of the State Department. 61 tension and unclear division of control between the executive and judicial branches was one of the primary issues the FSIA was enacted to resolve. 62 After Samantar, this same procedural confusion returned, and the tension quickly intensified, when the Executive asserted primary control over all determinations of foreign official immunity and effectively declared that step one was mandatory before a foreign defendant could proceed to step two. 63 
B. The Executive Upsets the Balance
Almost immediately after Samantar, the Executive sought a leading role over all requests for foreign official immunity. 64 In 2011, the year after the decision, the State Department's Legal Advisor, Harold Hongju Koh, declared that Samantar had vested primary control over determinations of foreign official immunity with the Executive. 65 Koh's interpretation of the Samantar holding was based on the Court's dicta that "[w]e have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official immunity." 66 The Legal Advisor's broad assertion of control based on the language in Samantar is questionable. 67 While the Court declared that "the common law" governed foreign official immunity 68 and recounted the historic twostep procedure, 69 it did not express an opinion about the appropriate balance of authority between the Executive and Judiciary and certainly did not declare that the Executive alone should make foreign official immunity determinations. 70 Nevertheless, the following year, the Justice Department invoked the same ambiguous language from Samantar to make the Executive's strongest and most destabilizing assertion of authority over the doctrine to date. 71 In April 2012, after Pakistan sought immunity for the ISI and its two officials, the district court stayed the proceedings and invited the views of the State Department. 72 Seven months later, the Executive submitted the Rosenberg Statement, a ten-page 73 document that declared the ISI immune under the FSIA and the Pakistani officials immune under the doctrine of foreign official immunity. 74 The statement was prepared by the Justice Department and was based in large part on a letter from Koh, the State Department Legal Advisor, to the Justice Department's Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Stuart Delery. 75 In the Rosenberg Statement, the Executive analyzed the ISI's immunity request and concluded that the spy agency was entitled to have the allegations against it dismissed "because it is a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA and no exception to immunity applies." 76 The Koh Letter 80 and Rosenberg Statement established a new legal standard in federal common law and are eerily similar to a famous State Department letter from sixty years before. 81 In 1952, the acting State Department Legal Advisor, Jack Tate, also sent a letter ("the Tate Letter") to the Justice Department outlining new rules regarding the immunity of foreign states. 82 In the Tate Letter, the State Department announced the adoption of a new and more restrictive policy of awarding immunity. 83 The new policy required a complicated analysis of the nature of a foreign state's conduct that was unclear and could sometimes be used to justify immunity for nonlegal or political reasons. 84 The letter caused such confusion that the Executive itself almost abandoned the new theory. 85 As a result, the State Department and courts struggled to apply the Tate Letter consistently, and Congress was forced to restore clarity through the FSIA. 86 The Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement are just as disruptive. Like the Tate Letter, they assert a new and mandatory State Department policy that would empower the Executive with controlling authority over such traditional judicial tasks as evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint or analyzing the nature of a defendant's conduct. 87 Combined with the requirement that all requests for immunity be submitted to the State Department in the first instance, the statements have inserted an unclear political element into federal common law that jeopardizes the impartiality of the foreign official immunity doctrine. The courts are already in conflict.
C. Confusion in the Courts
On September 30, 2013, more than seven months after the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement were filed, the court sided with the Executive and awarded immunity to the ISI and Pakistani officials. 88 The Rosenberg plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit and argued that the State Department's immunity determination was invalid and not dispositive because the allegations against the ISI officials related to conduct that violated jus cogens norms. 89 The plaintiffs argued that the officials could not receive immunity-and therefore the State Department's recommendation was not controlling-because the provision of material and financial support to terrorists can never be considered official or state sanctioned. 90 Therefore, the plaintiffs argued, the foreign official immunity doctrine does not protect officials who engage in such acts. 91 The plaintiffs supported their appeal by citing to Yousuf v. Samantar, 92 a Fourth Circuit decision that was issued a mere ten days before the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement were submitted by the Executive. 93 In November 2012, in a continuation of the same Samantar case the Supreme Court had decided in 2010, 94 the Fourth Circuit declared that State Department immunity determinations were not entitled to absolute deference 95 and-contrary to the views of the Executive 96 -foreign officials were not entitled to immunity for conduct that violated jus cogens norms. 97 When the same argument was used by the Rosenberg plaintiffs at the Second Circuit, the court rejected their appeal and, splitting with the Fourth Circuit, stated: "'[I]n the common-law context, [ 98 The Second Circuit's decision effectively cut federal common law into two camps. 99 After Rosenberg, foreign official defendants in the Second Circuit are entitled to immunity based on the views of the Executive. Foreign official defendants in the Fourth Circuit, however, do not receive such automatic protection because the State Department's views regarding conduct-based immunity are not dispositive, and jus cogens violations are not protectable. 100 In the aftermath of the circuit split and less than two years after the Koh Letter a statement of interest from the Executive, and the court was forced to decide whether it was bound by the Rosenberg Statement. 102 In August 2013, the former head of two Saudi Arabian charities sought dismissal from an action brought by the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which alleged he had sent financial and other material support to Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda in the years prior to the attacks. 103 The In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 104 plaintiffs argued that the Saudi official's immunity request was procedurally improper and should be denied because the court was not allowed to award immunity that was not first requested from the State Department. 105 After evaluating the Rosenberg Statement, Samantar, and the history of foreign immunities in general, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and the Executive's new policy. 106 The court awarded immunity to the former official based on its own analysis of the allegations in the complaint and its determination that the acts alleged were taken in the foreign official's official capacity. 107 An alternative argument that the Saudi official's conduct was unlawful, and thus not entitled to immunity, was also rejected because "[s]uch an assertion is merely an artful way of implicating the jus cogens doctrine, which is not recognized by the Second Circuit as an exception to common law [foreign official] immunity." 108 The court also supported its decision to reject the The law needs clarification. In the five years since Samantar, the Judiciary has been in a fight with itself and the Executive. Two circuits are on opposite sides regarding the deference owed to executive determinations of immunity and the type of conduct entitled to protection. The Executive has made a weakly supported grab for control over the entire process, only to have a district court reject that assertion in a way that appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the subject. The disarray is clear and requires a remedy. Fortunately, the history of foreign sovereign immunity serves as a useful case study.
II. THE HISTORY OF A SOLUTION: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS AN ANALOGY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court worked together to clarify and implement a workable foreign sovereign immunity doctrine. 129 The conflict involved two parts: the circumstances when a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity for (1) acts inside the sovereign's borders; and (2) acts outside the sovereign's borders. In 1964, the Supreme Court clarified the first situation when it reaffirmed 130 the federal common law act of state doctrine that granted immunity to a foreign sovereign for acts performed inside its borders. 131 Immunity for acts performed outside the foreign sovereign, however, proved intractable under federal common law because the analysis was complicated 132 and the division of authority among the branches of government forced the Executive into "the awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts." 133 In 1976, with full support from the State Department, Congress enacted the FSIA and empowered the courts with exclusive authority to decide requests for foreign sovereign immunity. 134 In essence, a statute was necessary because federal common law was not able to support a doctrine that awarded immunity to a foreign state for conduct that occurred outside its territorial borders, because the scope and complexity of the immunity analysis yielded inconsistent results. 135 Immunity for acts occurring within a sovereign's borders is governable by federal common law under the act of state doctrine because the relevant inquiry focuses on a straightforward question of locational identity: where the act occurred. 136 Immunity for acts outside the sovereign's borders is more complicated because it focuses on the nature of the act: whether the conduct is considered public or private. 137 As a result, immunity determinations for acts outside a sovereign's borders often hinge on particularized facts, and a clear set of guidelines-which a common-law based doctrine struggles to provide-was necessary to achieve consistency. As the analogy in this part shows, a common law solution can work for individual official immunity that is based on nothing more than identitysuch as head-of-state or consular immunity. But immunity that is based on the nature of a foreign entity's conduct is too complicated to be governed by federal common law.
This part examines the disarray that once existed in the federal common law of foreign sovereign immunity, the solution that was adopted to resolve that conflict, and the similarities between that history and the current conflict within the doctrine of foreign official immunity.
A. The Roots of Foreign Sovereign and Foreign Official Immunity in American Jurisprudence
The reciprocal practice where the United States does not subject a foreign sovereign to suit in U.S. courts was first recognized as a matter of federal common law by Chief Justice John Marshall's historic decision, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 138 In 1810, the French Navy commandeered a privately owned American ship as it sailed across the Atlantic Ocean. 139 When the ship's former owners learned that their hijacked vessel was anchored in the port of Philadelphia after seeking shelter during a storm, they sued the French government to recover the ship. 140 To their dismay, the district court dismissed their claim when the Executive intervened and recommended immunity for the French government. 141 immunity. 143 For more than a century, the judicial branch looked to customary international law to grant foreign states near-total amnesty from the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 144 Almost ninety years after Schooner Exchange, the act of state doctrine was first introduced. The doctrine extended immunity to all acts of a foreign state-including the personal protection of an individual-when the acts were performed inside the sovereign's territorial borders. 145 In Underhill v. Hernandez, 146 an American citizen living and working in Venezuela during the Revolution of 1892 was detained by a Venezuelan military leader. 147 When the American was freed and returned to the United States, he filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the official for false imprisonment, assault, and battery. 148 The district and circuit courts awarded immunity, 149 and the Supreme Court affirmed under the act of state doctrine. 150 Because the Venezuelan official had acted in an official capacity, and the tortious conduct occurred entirely inside the territorial boundaries of Venezuela, the Court famously declared that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." 151 After Underhill, federal common law granted absolute immunity to a foreign state for all acts within its borders, including the personal immunity of an individual when his or her actions were considered the acts of the sovereign. 152 In the late 1930s and early 1940s, federal common law evolved again when the Supreme Court started giving tremendous deference to the Executive in cases involving foreign affairs. 153 As the world entered a new era of global commerce, foreign sovereigns and private individuals began to interact in more frequent and significant ways. 154 162 in which the Court declared that immunity determinations by the Executive were controlling and "must be accepted by the courts." 163 By the early 1950s, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was an imperfect blend of executive and judicial authority, but the system worked relatively well because the law was built on the stable foundation of absolute immunity. 164 Under the absolute theory of immunity, the analysis focused on identity: if the defendant was a foreign state, it usually was entitled to immunity. That stability was shattered, however, when the absolute theory of immunity was replaced by the new restrictive theory. 165 Overnight, the doctrine's bedrock principle of analysis changed, and the law devolved into a mess of politics, confusion, and uncertainty. 166 
B. The Tate Letter and Conflict in the Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
In 1952, the United States joined a majority of other nations and adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. 167 169 This shift, however, complicated the immunity doctrine because the governing standards that identified conduct that was "nonsovereign" or "commercial" were unclear and required a careful analysis of the plaintiff's allegations. 170 The disarray was further compounded by the holdings in Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, 171 because the branch that had the most expertise evaluating the nuances of "nonofficial" or "private" conduct 172 was bound to accept the immunity determinations of a highly political branch that lacked "the machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review." 173 After the Tate Letter, foreign defendants would often petition the State Department for a suggestion of immunity under step one of the two-step procedure, 174 then exert political pressure for a recommendation that was entitled to absolute deference in the courts. 175 The State Department struggled to make impartial decisions, and "[o]n occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory." 176 As a result, politics sometimes interfered with the legal rights of private litigants, and immunity determinations were made on nonlegal grounds, under procedures that did not ensure due process. 177 Litigants also suffered from a lack of information because the justifications for immunity were usually short, and "very often no indication was given as to why immunity was recognized." 178 The Executive's inconsistent application of the restrictive theory also had ripple effects in the courts because judges were required to render immunity determinations in accordance with the State Department's unclear policies. 179 Under step two, when a foreign state wanted to avoid political considerations-or the Executive entirely-it could petition a court
See id. ("[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).").
Interestingly, the letter also incorrectly commented on the decisional tug-of-war between the executive and judicial branches when it observed "that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts. 185 For more than ten years, the doctrine limped along. Finally, in the mid1960s, the executive and legislative branches agreed that the law was broken and a statutory fix was necessary. 186 In 1976, after almost twentyfive years of case-by-case determinations made by two rival branches of government, Congress enacted the FSIA. 187 The statute codified the restrictive theory and placed full authority over foreign sovereign immunity determinations with the courts. 188 It helped free the Executive from diplomatic pressure to engage in horse-trading for suggestions of immunity by removing political considerations from the analysis. The FSIA also helped the courts by placing the law under a set of clear statutory guidelines to ensure immunity was granted for only legal reasons that were subject to appellate review. 189 It was a remarkable success. 190 
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Congress had two primary goals when it enacted the FSIA. First, it wanted to clarify the law by establishing "when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States." 191 Second, and more importantly, it wanted to eliminate the disarray in federal common law that necessitated the need for a statute in the first place by "facilitat [ Under "the pre-existing common law" 193 that the FSIA set out to fix, immunity determinations represented "a devil's choice" 194 that placed the United States in a lose-lose situation. Foreign countries could use the twostep procedure to pressure the State Department into awarding immunity in circumstances that were not consistent with the restrictive theory. 195 The second-and third-order effects of such political or foreign policy-motivated immunity determinations not only harmed private litigants, but also made diplomacy more difficult. 196 When the State Department engaged in horsetrading or awarded immunity on questionable legal grounds, relations with third-party states could suffer when those uninvolved states were denied immunity in the future under similar circumstances. 197 The nonreciprocal nature of the situation also compounded the lose-lose dynamic because the United States usually could not obtain the same sort of case-by-case preferential treatment in the justice systems of other countries. 198 In the United States, a decision to deny immunity had significant drawbacks because foreign states knew that immunity was an option, and the denial could be viewed as an unfriendly act. 199 Likewise, a decision to grant immunity also had drawbacks because the decision could cause tension with uninvolved parties, 200 make future diplomacy or immunity determinations more difficult, and negatively impact the ability of a private litigant to obtain recourse. 201 The FSIA corrected that lose-lose dynamic when it eliminated step one of the two-step procedure.
For the most part, the FSIA works remarkably well 202 because the executive and judicial branches work together in a way that employs the expertise and constitutional authority of each. 203 The Executive plays a minor role through its recognition power and authority to designate state sponsors of terrorism. 204 The courts play the dominant role based on their expertise interpreting statutes, applying the law, and evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. 205 The FSIA converts a judge-made or political decision into a statutory interpretation question under straightforward and relatively clear guidelines. 206 The statute awards immunity to a foreign state for all acts, minus certain specified exceptions such as waiver, commercial activity, or state sponsors of terrorism. 207 While complications sometimes arise over whether an exception applies, the doctrine is stable and consistent because the FSIA is interpreted and applied by the courts based on precedent and subject to appellate review. 208 The statute gives the doctrine the stability it lacked under federal common law. 209 The FSIA is also admirable because of its impact on international law and the immunity doctrines adopted by other nations. 210 The statute was the first of its kind and served as a model for the immunity laws in other countries. 211 Since 1976, many states have actually gone a step further and codified the immunity of foreign officials in the same statutory structure as the immunity of foreign sovereigns. 212 The United States, however, appears to be in a situation analogous to the late 1960s and early 1970s: its doctrine of foreign official immunity is in disarray, while the legal systems of many other countries have evolved to incorporate the immunity of foreign individuals under comprehensive and nonpolitical statutory doctrines. 
III. THE GRACEFUL EXIT: AGAINST EXECUTIVE BRANCH MONOPOLY
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS The State Department's role in the doctrine of foreign official immunity is the subject of much ongoing debate and scholarly work. 214 This part discusses the justifications the Executive has given for that role and its authority to make the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement's assertions of control.
In the 2015 decision, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 215 a divided Supreme Court affirmed the executive branch's exclusive authority to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign. 216 The decision was limited to a specific situation that did not involve foreign official immunity; but the Court's treatment of the proper role of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs helps inform the discussion about the proper role of the Executive in matters involving foreign official immunity because the Executive justifies its assertions of control by invoking "its constitutional authority over foreign affairs." 217 Zivotofsky is especially relevant if executive authority over foreign affairs in the context of foreign official immunity is viewed as a function of its recognition power. 218 The State Department, however, has wisely avoided making such an argument because the constitutionality of the FSIA, 219 which would infringe on that exclusive authority, cuts against the Executive's assertions in the Rosenberg Statement. 220 Nevertheless, Zivotofsky's majority and dissenting opinions cast doubt on the Rosenberg Statement even under the broader "foreign affairs power," because absolute control by the executive branch is extreme and in conflict with the constitutional system of checks and balances. 221 This part examines arguments in favor of executive control. Part III.A explores federal common law and draws parallels between the two types of foreign official immunity and the two theories of foreign sovereign immunity discussed in Part II. Part III.B evaluates the scope of the Executive's "constitutional authority over foreign affairs" 222 through the lens of Zivotofsky. Part III.C examines Supreme Court precedent and considers the dual World War II-era decisions 223 that the Executive invokes to assert the binding nature of its immunity determinations. Informed by this new examination of federal common law, the Constitution, and Supreme Court precedent, this part concludes that the Rosenberg Statement's assertion of total control is inappropriate as well as imprudent.
A. Status-and Conduct-Based Immunities
Foreign official immunity can be classified into two types: (1) immunity based on an individual's status, and (2) immunity based on an individual's conduct. 224 Status-based immunities apply to individuals such as sitting heads of state or diplomats and extend to the individual based on the unique position he or she occupies on behalf of the foreign state. 225 Conduct-based immunities, on the other hand, apply to an individual's acts and are derived from the foreign state's delegation of responsibility to the official to operate within a certain scope of authority. 226 Similar to the relationship between the absolute and restrictive theories of foreign sovereign immunity, the two types of individual immunity are closely related to each other, but are just different enough to cause complications with their application under federal common law. 227 Status-based immunity focuses on the identity of the individual and is similar to the absolute theory. 228 Immunity based on status protects a foreign official if the individual is a member of a certain group-similar to the way the absolute theory once protected a defendant if it was deemed a foreign sovereign. 229 Conduct-based immunity, on the other hand, focuses on the individual's acts and is similar to the restrictive theory that was codified by the FSIA. 230 Immunity based on conduct protects a foreign official when the nature of the acts in question are "official" or are attributable to the sovereign. It does not protect an individual when the acts are considered private or personal-similar to the restrictive theory's "public versus commercial" distinction. 231 222. Koh The similarity of the two types of individual immunity to the two theories of sovereign immunity helps inform a solution to the current disarray in the doctrine of foreign official immunity. 232 Under the absolute theory, the system of executive determinations of state immunity worked well partly because the question that decided whether immunity was appropriatewhether the defendant was a foreign sovereign-was a question very similar to recognition and well within the Executive's scope of authority and expertise. 233 When the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity replaced the absolute theory, the doctrine fell into disarray because the relevant question was no longer as straightforward. 234 Under the restrictive theory-and in a conduct-based immunity analysis-the critical inquiry asks whether the acts alleged in the complaint are "official" or "private." The problematic nature of an inquiry that evaluates the nuances of conduct was the very reason the restrictive theory did not work as a matter of federal common law and had to be codified by the FSIA. 235 
B. Zivotofsky v. Kerry and Executive Authority Over Foreign Affairs
The State Department's primary justification for control over foreign official immunity determinations is grounded in the Executive's constitutional authority over foreign affairs. 236 Courts are usually very deferential to the President in cases that affect foreign policy 237 because the Constitution gives the Executive tremendous power in the context of foreign affairs, and foreign relations requires "one voice" that "must be the President's." 238 The Executive, however, is not given absolute control. 239 As with nearly all areas of the law, the Constitution tempers the power it gives to a single branch through the system of checks and balances. 240 Executive control over foreign affairs is limited by congressional authority over such areas as spending, treaty ratifications, and declarations of war 241 and is further limited by the judicial branch's authority of review. 242 Less than a year ago, the Court provided a lengthy discussion about the Executive's foreign affairs power. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that an act of Congress requiring the State Department to list "Jerusalem, Israel" on U.S. passports was an unconstitutional intrusion on the Executive's exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns formally. 243 In its discussion, the Court repeatedly observed that the Executive did not have absolute control over the conduct of foreign relations because the system of checks and balances gave Congress the authority to act in ways that limit the Executive's ability to act internationally. 244 The six-to-three decision was limited to the circumstances in question because the majority and dissent did not agree about whether the passport requirement implicated the recognition power. 245 The case is still helpful to the discussion about the Executive's role over foreign official immunity determinations, however, because of the similar ways in which the majority and dissent characterized the Executive's authority over foreign affairs. 246 In essence, both sides agreed that the Executive is entitled to deference in the conduct of foreign relations because in that context, "assurances cannot be equivocal" and "[f]oreign countries need to know, before entering into diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States, [information such as] whether their officials will be immune from suit in federal court." 247 That being said, both sides also agreed that even though the Executive should have tremendous authority over foreign affairs, that authority is still subject to checks and balances by the other branches of government. 248 Moreover, where the Executive has asserted absolute control over an aspect of foreign affairs-such as recognizing a foreign state-the Court indicated that Congress has a responsibility to check and balance that assertion through its own law-making powers. 249 The Rosenberg Statement's assertion of total control over foreign official immunity is open to doubt in light of the Court's analysis of the Executive's scope of authority over foreign affairs. While the Executive certainly has authority to declare an entity a foreign sovereign to which the FSIA or federal common law could grant immunity, the system of checks and balances dilutes the Executive's authority actually to take unilateral action on that recognition 250 because the Executive does not have "unbounded 246. See id. at 2084 (majority opinion) (stating "[l]egal consequences follow formal recognition" and recognized sovereigns "may benefit from sovereign immunity when they are sued"); id. at 2112 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "[i]mportant consequences are understood to flow from one state's recognition of another [such as the ability to] invoke sovereign immunity").
247. Id. at 2086 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2113-14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing "serious doubts" that the Executive's recognition power is entitled to absolute deference).
248. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2107 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2126 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion). 250. See id. at 2088.
power" over all aspects of foreign affairs. 251 The Executive's authority actually to act on the recognition it makes must be tempered in some way by the other branches of government. 252 Therefore, an immunity doctrine where "it is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official's official capacity" 253 is probably too extreme to fit under the scope of the Executive's foreign affairs power. Congress is the most appropriate body to temper the Executive. Under current federal common law as it relates to foreign official immunity, the courts are already too deferential to sufficiently check and balance the Executive's authority. 254 The clearest example of that undue deference can be seen in the weight that is still given to the pre-Tate Letter decisions, Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, decisions that, after the shift to the restrictive theory, should no longer control and which one renowned legal scholar believes "were wrongly reasoned-if not wrongly decided." 255
C. Hoffman and Ex parte Peru Under the Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
While the Executive probably does not have the constitutional authority to assert the degree of control over foreign official immunity determinations that it has, 256 even if the Rosenberg Statement is retracted, a thorny issue remains because the Executive can still invoke Hoffman and Ex parte Peru to achieve a similar outcome. 257 Under 28 U.S.C. § 517, the Executive may, sua sponte, submit a statement of interest in any pending litigation. 258 Under Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, the courts are required to defer to executive branch determinations of immunity. 259 Therefore, because Hoffman and Ex parte Peru appear to be binding, 260 the Executive can still assert control over foreign official immunity determinations in a way that remains unchecked and unbalanced.
Such a sleight of hand, however, should not be available to the Executive because Hoffman and Ex parte Peru are not applicable under the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity and should not be binding on the courts. 261 Hoffman and Ex parte Peru were decided in the pre-FSIA era of absolute immunity when foreign states (and their officials) were entitled to immunity simply because the states were recognized as foreign sovereigns. 262 Under the absolute theory, mandatory deference was appropriate 263 because immunity depended on identity and/or recognitiontraditional areas of executive branch authority and expertise. 264 But when the Executive embraced the restrictive theory through the Tate Letter and supported its codification under the FSIA, the Executive waived its right to the sort of absolute control Hoffman and Ex parte Peru allowed. 265 After the FSIA, foreign sovereign immunity is restricted to certain types of conduct. 266 Because the statute vested sole authority in the courts to make that conduct-based analysis, a suggestion of immunity from the Executive regarding a foreign state's immunity should not be binding because the FSIA explicitly eliminated the role of the Executive from such determinations. 267 That same logic should extend to modern day determinations of foreign official immunity because the immunity of foreign individuals flows out of the immunity of the foreign state. 268 Hoffman and Ex parte Peru's mandatory deference under the restrictive theory is invalid because the decisions applied to immunity under the absolute theory, and the Tate Letter and FSIA changed the foundational immunity question. 269 If the courts are not required to submit blindly to executive recommendations of foreign sovereign immunity, it is illogical to require mandatory deference to determinations of foreign official immunity that necessitates the same conduct-based immunity analysis that the FSIA purposefully took away from the Executive. 270 While the Supreme Court in Samantar did observe that "[w]e have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official immunity," 271 the shift from the absolute theory to the restrictive theory-that is to say, the Tate The first step toward solving a problem is admitting that one exists. Currently, the courts and Executive are locked into an unnecessary and selfdefeating tug-of-war that Congress must acknowledge and regulate. 274 The circumstances are ripe to codify the doctrine under a foreign official immunity statute because the Executive has overplayed its hand with the Rosenberg Statement, 275 and the resulting disarray should help focus attention on the problem in a way that compels action. 276 For purely pragmatic reasons, the Executive should unilaterally retract the Rosenberg Statement's assertions of control and seek only an advisory role in foreign official immunity determinations because Executive authority over pending litigation actually makes diplomacy more difficult. 277 In the meantime, the courts should evaluate foreign official immunity requests in the same manner as In re Terrorist Attacks and treat Executive suggestions of immunity as just that-suggestions. 278 This part argues in favor of a statute that places foreign official immunity determinations under a procedure similar to foreign sovereign immunity. A foreign official immunity statute still would allow the Executive to assert varying degrees of influence-not control-over judicial determinations of 272. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 273. The Judiciary's current deference to Hoffman and Ex parte Peru also demonstrates that a nonstatutory fix, such as the application of customary international law to federal common law, is not the best way to resolve the current disarray. Cf. Wuerth 
A. Status-Based Immunity to the Executive
Status-based foreign official immunity determinations are basically acts of recognition 283 that fall under the Executive's Article II, section 3 power to "receive ambassadors and other public ministers." 284 As a result, executive suggestions of status-based immunity are more appropriately viewed as executive recognitions of immunity that are "'a quintessentially executive function' for which absolute deference is proper." 285 Therefore, a new statute should vest authority for determinations of status-based immunity with the Executive.
B. Conduct-Based Immunity to the Judiciary
Determinations of conduct-based foreign official immunity should be vested with the courts because the judicial branch has the most experience and expertise in evaluating conduct. Moreover, the history of foreign sovereign immunity demonstrates that a clear standard, subject to review by a higher authority, and applied by a nonpolitical body, is the most effective system. 286 Similar to the way the Federal Tort Claims Act 287 requires the U.S. government to take responsibility for "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment," 288 conduct-based immunity determinations should force a foreign sovereign to take responsibility for the harmful acts of its officials. 289 When a foreign individual seeks immunity for conduct that he or she performed on behalf of a foreign state, the immunity that is awarded is best viewed as the immunity of the foreign sovereign because the actions of the individual are essentially the actions of the state. 290 Sometimes, when a foreign official seeks immunity, the analysis that is conducted is incomplete because it only asks whether the foreign official's conduct was "official conduct" in the sense that it could be taken on behalf of the foreign state. Analysis that only inquires whether conduct could be official does not determine whether the foreign state actually takes responsibility for such conduct. Such analysis is problematic because it does not require the foreign state affirmatively to declare that the foreign official's alleged conduct, if proven, was state sanctioned. A foreign official immunity statute can fix that by requiring a state affirmatively to extend its immunity before an official is entitled to protection. 291 Consider two examples. In Matar v. Dichter, 292 an Israeli military officer was sued for allegedly authorizing the bombing of a building in Gaza that killed Palestinian civilians. 293 The official was awarded immunity, however, after the Israeli government effectively stepped into his shoes and took responsibility for the decision to bomb. 294 The allegations of wrongdoing by the official were dismissed because the official's conduct was attributable to the state, and under the FSIA, the tortious act that was alleged in the complaint was a sovereign act entitled to immunity. 295 In Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 296 on the other hand, Pakistan was never required to take responsibility for the allegations of providing financial and material support to the Mumbai terrorists. 297 The State Department determined that the ISI officials should receive immunity because the Executive itself viewed the allegations in the complaint as official acts. 298 Pakistan was not forced to declare affirmatively that, if proven, the act of providing financial and material support to LeT would constitute a sovereign act. Conduct-based immunity probably should not be available to foreign officials without an affirmation by the foreign state to extend its sovereign immunity over the alleged acts of its officials. 299 The ratification process for a foreign official immunity statute would force a debate over whether the sovereign itself must take responsibility, as Israel did in Matar and as the United States does under the Federal Tort Claims Act, or whether the courts may impute responsibility and decide for themselves when a foreign official is "acting within the scope of his office or employment," 300 as the State Department did in Rosenberg. The ratification process would also be an excellent opportunity to resolve the split between the Second and Fourth Circuits regarding immunity for jus cogens violations. 301 
CONCLUSION
A statute that codifies foreign official immunity is good for everyone. For Congress, it enables oversight of the State Department and protects the legal rights of private individuals. For the Executive, it eliminates the strain that foreign official immunity requests currently place on diplomatic relations. For the Judiciary, it brings order to the law and gives courts and litigants a clear idea of the legal playing field. A statutory fix also benefits the weak and marginalized victims of a foreign state who are the litigants most likely to be harmed by an unclear immunity doctrine because they most likely cannot compete with the lobbying and legal power of the sovereign.
History has a habit of repeating itself. The United States should not be forced to wait another twenty-five years for a statute to resolve disorder created by executive overreach. Congress must act. (1) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) Vest all foreign official immunity determinations with the courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter. (1) is an official, so designated by a foreign state as defined in subsection (c); (2) acts on behalf of a foreign state as defined in subsection (c); (3) acts in an official capacity; and (4) acts within the scope of his or her official responsibility. (c) A "foreign state" is any entity that-, As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign official is not entitled to immunity under section 6 of this chapter, the foreign official shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances including for punitive damages.
SECTION 8. COUNTERCLAIMS. In any action brought by a foreign official, or in which a foreign official intervenes, in the courts of the United States or of the States, the foreign official shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim-, (a) for which a foreign official would not be entitled to immunity under section 6 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against the foreign official; or (b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign official; or (c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign official.
SECTION 9. SERVICE; TIME TO ANSWER; DEFAULT. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable. SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date of its enactment.
DRAFTING NOTES This statute only applies to natural persons who act in some sort of official capacity on behalf of a foreign state that is itself entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Judicial analysis of a foreign individual's request for dismissal under this statute should begin with an examination of the foreign state that has petitioned the court for immunity on behalf of the foreign individual. If the court determines that the foreign state is entitled to protection under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the court should then consider whether the foreign official is entitled to status-based immunity under section 4, or conduct-based immunity under section 5. If the foreign official is entitled to status-based immunity under section 4, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations against the foreign official and must dismiss the suit. If the foreign official seeks conduct-based immunity under section 5, the court should engage in a thorough analysis of the merits of the affirmative defense. If conduct-based immunity is appropriate, the court must dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Section 4 intentionally omits the requirement that international agreements be in place prior to enactment of this statute to give Congress and the Executive the flexibility to modify the scope of status-based immunity through future international agreements.
